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Lines of Descent: Kuhn and Beyond 
 
Abstract 
Thomas S. Kuhn is famous both for his work on the Copernican Revolution and his 
‘paradigm’ view of scientific revolutions. But Kuhn later abandoned the notion of paradigm 
(and related notions) in favour of a more ‘evolutionary’ view of the history of science. 
Kuhn’s position therefore moved closer to ‘continuity’ models of scientific progress, for 
instance ‘chain-of-reasoning’ models, originally championed by D. Shapere. The purpose of 
this paper is to contribute to the debate around Kuhn’s new ‘developmental’ view and to 
evaluate these competing models with reference to some major innovations in the history 
of cosmology, from Copernicanism to modern cosmology. This evaluation is made possible 
through some unexpected overlap between Kuhn’s earlier discontinuity model and various 
versions of the later continuity models. It is the thesis of this paper that the ‘chain-of-
reasoning’ model accounts better for the cosmological evidence than both Kuhn’s early 
paradigm model and his later developmental view of the history of science. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3 
 
It is hard to think of an area of intellectual inquiry that has changed more in the past century 
than cosmology and the shift has transformed how we view the world. L. M. Krauss/R. J. 
Scherrer, The End of Cosmology, Scientific American 298/3 (2008), p. 46 
 
I. Introduction 
Thomas S. Kuhn is best known for his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (11962), 
which characterizes numerous brief episodes in the history of science, including Copernican 
heliocentrism, as ‘revolutionary’ periods. But Kuhn’s most elaborate exploration of a 
scientific revolution is provided by the masterly analysis in his earlier book The Copernican 
Revolution (1957). In this book, Kuhn describes Copernicus as a precursor of a scientific 
revolution. His book De Revolutionibus (1543) is a ‘revolution-making rather than a 
revolutionary text.’ (Kuhn 1957, p. 183) For readers unfamiliar with the astronomical theory 
of Nicholas Copernicus (1473-1543), it may be useful to remind them of some of his 
achievements. In a departure from a long tradition, which had its roots in Greek thought, 
Copernicus proposed a heliocentric view of the universe, in opposition to the established 
geocentric view, whose chief contributors were Aristotle (354-322 BC) and Ptolemy (100-
175 AD). Copernicus made the Earth a planet, which orbited the central (mean) sun. To 
place the sun at the centre of the then known universe was not in itself an original idea. The 
Greek astronomer Aristarchus of Samos (çirca 310-230 BC) had already constructed a 
heliocentric world system, which made the Earth rotate daily on its own axis and annually 
around the sun. The diurnal rotation of the Earth was proposed by several thinkers 
throughout the ages (Herakleides, Buridan, Oresme, Nicolaus of Cues). But no technical 
details of Aristarchus’s system have survived so that Copernicus became the first known 
astronomer to construct a coherent, mathematical system of planetary motion from a 
heliocentric perspective. In the Greek tradition all the planets and their motions were 
treated separately but Copernicus’s aim was to derive all the observational data of the 
planets’ orbits from the assumption of a moving Earth. Thus Copernicus was the first 
astronomer to propose a detailed account of the astronomical consequences of the Earth’s 
motion, as part of a planetary system. (Kuhn 1957, pp. 142-4; Weinert 2009, §3.1) It is 
important to observe that although Copernicus reports his own observations of the sky, his 
observations do not reach beyond the discoveries of his Greek predecessors. He does not 
discover new facts about the planets. It is equally important to realize that Copernicus still 
adheres to much of the Greek tradition in his mathematical techniques. Like his illustrious 
Greek predecessors, Aristotle and Ptolemy, he uses geometry to describe the motions of the 
then known 6 planets. Most importantly, Copernicus does not abandon the fundamental 
Greek idea that all celestial objects must move in circles around a central body, since the 
circle was the most perfect geometric figure. Perfection and harmony, to the Greek mind, 
characterized the heavens.  
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Given these few rudimentary facts about the Copernican system, especially his profound 
indebtedness to the Greek tradition, the obvious question, which many historians of science 
have asked, is whether the Copernican model constitutes a scientific revolution. The epithet 
‘Copernican revolution’ is sometimes bestowed on the whole period from the publication of 
the Copernican treatise (1543) to the publication of Newton’s Principia (1687) and 
sometimes on the Copernican theory itself. In the present context the question is only 
whether the Copernican theory itself is revolutionary, since there is little disagreement that 
the period from Copernicus to Newton constitutes indeed a scientific revolution. But such 
questions cannot be settled without some pre-given criteria of what constitutes a scientific 
revolution. Historical judgements on this question have therefore varied widely. The 
historian of science De Solla Price saw in Copernicus’s book ‘little more than a reshuffled 
version of [Ptolemy’s] Almagest’. (De Solla Price 1962, p. 215)  Arthur Koestler also detected 
little originality in Copernicus, characterizing him as a ‘stuffy pedant’, but also recognized in 
him a ‘crystallizer of thought’. (Koestler 1964, pp. 205, 113) E. Rosen found that ‘Copernicus 
did not foment a “Copernican Revolution”’ (Rosen 1984, pp. 132-3), whilst for A. C. Crombie 
(1961, p. 168) the Copernican Revolution consisted in the link Copernicus established 
between the diurnal and annual revolution of the Earth and the motion of the planets. J. H. 
Randall (1962, pp. 308-15) was more willing to grant Copernicus the title of a scientific 
revolutionary, whilst H. Blumenberg (1955; 1965) acknowledged Copernicus above all as an 
intellectual reformer. Similarly, for O. Gingerich, Copernicus was a ‘sensitive visionary who 
precipitated a scientific revolution.’ (Gingerich 1993, p. 201) Reflecting these divergent 
assessments of Copernicus’s achievement, we observe in Kuhn’s work a transition from a 
conservative to a liberal view in the span of a few years (1957-62), which may be attributed 
to a change in his views on what constitutes a scientific revolution. 
II. Kuhn’s assessment of Copernicus  
Kuhn’s most careful exploration of a scientific revolution is to be found in his analysis of the 
early history of astronomy from the Greeks to Newton. In this book The Copernican 
Revolution (1957) Kuhn goes beyond the assessments of de Solla Price and Koestler and 
agrees with O. Gingerich that Copernicus is best described as a precursor of a scientific 
revolution. Unlike Rosen he sees in Copernicus’s book De Revolutionibus (1543) a 
‘revolution-making rather than a revolutionary text.’ (Kuhn 1957, p. 183) The Copernican 
system has aesthetic advantages, since it derives from the principle of a moving Earth a 
natural explanation of one of the gross planetary irregularities in Greek astronomy: the 
apparent retrograde (westward) motion of planets becomes a matter of the perspective of 
an Earth-bound observer who assesses the motion of planets around the sun against the 
background of the fixed stars. Although Copernicus abides by the Greek notion of uniform 
circular motion, he departs from Ptolemy by adopting a simple ‘distance-period’ relationship 
to assess the relative distances of the planets from the sun. The rule states that the further 
a planet is away from the sun, the longer is its orbital period. But Copernicus produced no 
decisive evidence, which could demonstrate that a Copernican hypothesis is more probable 
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than a geocentric hypothesis. However, Kuhn’s tone changes in Structure, where he states, 
in many passages, that the replacement of Aristotelian-Ptolemaic geocentrism by 
Copernican heliocentrism is a paragon of a scientific revolution.  Copernicus is discussed in 
the same breath as Newton, Lavoisier and Einstein and is hailed as the originator of a new 
paradigm. (Kuhn 1970a, pp. 6, 66, 92, 116, 180, 200) 
Of central importance in the present context is the question whether the Copernican model 
of 1543 was a scientific revolution or a precursor to a scientific revolution – two aspects of 
Kuhn’s assessment of the situation.1 As mentioned before the answer to this question 
depends on the criteria adopted but, crucially, the criteria themselves must be adequate for 
a historical judgement of a particular episode, like the Copernican heliocentric model. 
Before these criteria are discussed, it will be helpful to add some further historical material 
regarding the Copernican model. It has already been mentioned that Copernicus’s 
commitment to circular orbits and geometry marks a significant element of continuity 
between his work and that of his Greek predecessors. But there is also a significant element 
of discontinuity, hinted at by Crombie, which has not been sufficiently emphasized in the 
literature. Copernicus becomes the first astronomer to successfully treat the planets and the 
sun as a coherent system. The cosmologist, Aristotle, provided a qualitative model of the 
whole cosmos but Aristotle’s astronomical, concentric model of the planetary system failed 
because it did not respect the ‘distance-period’ relationship. Ptolemy, the mathematical 
astronomer, accepted Aristotle’s cosmological principles – especially the centrality of a 
stationary Earth – but, for computational reasons, treated each planet separately and in 
isolation from each other. Copernicus binds the planets into a coherent system, with the sun 
at the ‘centre’, such that the removal or displacement of one element would disrupt the 
entire system. Such a commitment imposes an important constraint on the model.  
And so, having laid down the movements which I attribute to the Earth farther on in the work, 
I finally discovered by the help of long and numerous observations that if the movements of 
the other wandering stars are correlated with the circular movement of the Earth, and if the 
movements are computed in accordance with the revolution of each planet, not only do all 
their phenomena follow from that but also this correlation binds together so closely the order 
and magnitudes of all the planets and of their spheres or orbital circles and the heavens 
themselves that nothing can be shifted around in any part of them without disrupting the 
remaining parts and the universe as a whole. (Copernicus 1543, p. 6)  
The conception of the coherence of planetary phenomena obliges the Copernicans to build 
a model of the planetary system, which must accommodate all the known empirical data. 
They were not altogether successful but the balance of successes and failures of the 
Copernican system provides useful indicators as to the criteria of scientific revolutions. 
Given these main lines of continuity and discontinuity it may be best to characterize 
Copernicus’s work as a Copernican turn: a change in perspective but not a revolution, in line 
                                                          
1
 One may want to avoid such considerations by concentrating on the role of new premises in the transition 
between theories (cf. Vickers 2013) but Kuhn’s concern throughout his career has been with the nature of 
scientific revolutions. 
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with Kuhn’s original 1957 verdict. As will be discussed, later on M. Maestlin and J. Kepler 
produced plausibility arguments in favour of the Copernican model. This cautious 
assessment depends of course on some chosen criteria, which may serve to characterize a 
scientific revolution. But it is supported by the lines of continuity and discontinuity, which 
have emerged in the Copernican story. In order to arrive at some acceptable criteria it will 
be convenient to compare views of scientific revolutions, which put the emphasis on such 
lines of descent, which include Kuhn’s ‘paradigm’ view and his later ‘evolutionary’ view, as 
well as the ‘chain-of-reasoning’ model.2 
III. Lines of Descent 
In the first edition of his famous book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (11962) Kuhn 
presented a ‘discontinuity’ view of the history of scientific thinking, based on the notion of 
paradigm change. (Kuhn 1970a; cf. Kuhn 1978, p. 362) This discontinuity view is 
accompanied by an acceptance of cumulative growth, which is restricted to periods of 
normal science. By contrast Popper defended a ‘continuity’ model, based on conjectures, 
error elimination and tentative solutions. Popper’s conjectures and refutations allow for 
discontinuity, since falsified theories must be eliminated and replaced by better theories. 
Popper nevertheless defends a Lamarckian view of the progress of science, since he sees 
science as aiming at truth and asymptotically approaching it (verisimilitude). 3  This 
Lamarckian view implies a cumulative image of the growth of scientific knowledge. The idea 
of degrees of verisimilitude may hold only between two theories. Theory T2, for instance, is 
‘better’ than theory T1, if it passes more stringent tests than T1. But Popper also proposes a 
global sense of verisimilitude as an ideal.  
Verisimilitude is so defined that maximum verisimilitude would be achieved only by a theory 
which is not only true, but completely comprehensively true: if it corresponds to all facts, as it 
were, and, of course, only to real facts. This is of course a much more remote and 
unattainable ideal than a mere correspondence with some facts (…). (Popper 1963, p. 234; 
emphasis in original) 
Popper defends a correspondence theory of truth, which Kuhn disavows. (Kuhn 1990/2000, 
pp. 99-100; 1991/2000, p. 115)  Kuhn deserves credit for a) having put the notion of 
scientific revolutions firmly on the agenda of the philosophy of science and b) for having 
drawn attention to discontinuities between scientific theories, separated by the gulf of a 
scientific revolution. In doing so Kuhn posed a challenge to the traditional ideas of 
cumulative scientific progress. For instance, Kuhn treats the theory of relativity as a 
revolutionary paradigm change and defends the ‘minority view’ that ‘Einstein’s theory can 
                                                          
2
 The paper will focus on the approaches developed by Kuhn and, in response, by Shapere, respectively, 
because of their agreement on lines of descent. Cohen’s 4-stage model of scientific revolutions (Cohen 1985) 
and Friedman’s views on ‘inter-paradigm convergence’ (Friedman 2001, Pt. I, §3; Pt. II, §3) are versions of the 
‘chain-of-reasoning’ approach. Friedman, for instance, discusses ‘transformations of old constitutive 
frameworks’ (2001, p. 101), which give rise to lines of descent between paradigms. 
3
 An evolutionary analogy of the growth of science may not be compatible with truth or verisimilitude as the 
aims of science; see the discussion in Rowbottom (2010) 
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be accepted only with the recognition that Newton was wrong.’ (Kuhn 1970a, pp. 98, 102; 
1986/2000, p. 74) Kuhn adopts a strictly non-teleological image of scientific development as 
unidirectional, irreversible growth. He employs the image of the survival of the fittest. (Kuhn 
1970a, pp. 172, 206; cf. Bird 2011, §2)  According to this view science does not grow 
towards some ultimate aim but adapts in response to the growing complexity of the 
problem situations, which comprise the (perceived) problem(s), at a particular epoch, the 
available techniques, empirical data and presuppositions. If there is an aim it is to find the 
‘fittest way to practice future science’ (Kuhn 1970a, p. 172) or to maximize efficiency in 
puzzle-solving (Kuhn 1983, p. 563/2000, p. 209; 1990/2000, p. 96). Still the ‘Postscript’ 
makes clear that theories are to be seen as ‘related by descent’. (Kuhn 1970a, p. 205) A 
Darwinian image of an evolutionary tree implies both a discontinuous view of the growth of 
scientific knowledge – like species, old theories may become extinct – but retains 
continuous elements – like species, theories adapt to a ‘more refined understanding of 
nature.’ (Kuhn 1970a, p. 170) Replacements of old paradigms are not cumulative; they 
appear like mere change because scientific revolutions lead to a reconfiguration of the map 
of knowledge. (Kuhn 1975; Shapere 1980, p.35; Díez 2007) Kuhn’s intention was to provide 
a language, a framework, with which scientific revolutions could be investigated and 
analyzed (paradigm, incommensurability, meaning variance, communication breakdown and 
relativism). According to this framework scientific revolutions are ultimately changes in 
world views. But, as just indicated, even successive paradigms are linked by lines of descent 
and hence one can expect both continuity and discontinuity. As Kuhn’s views evolved the 
emphasis shifted from discontinuity to continuity. As the later Kuhn began to stress the 
importance of incremental changes his views began to resemble the ‘chain-reasoning’ 
approach. Early signs of this shift can already be discerned in his ‘paradigm’ model of 
scientific revolutions.  
A. Kuhn’s Paradigm Model of Scientific Revolutions.  
According to the early Kuhn, the history of science consists of a series of ‘pre-paradigm’, 
‘normal’ and ‘extraordinary’ periods. (Kuhn 1970a; cf. Hoyningen-Huene 1993) A pre-
paradigm period is a stage of a science when no dominant paradigm has yet appeared and a 
number of theories compete with each other for dominance. A normal period of science is 
marked by the presence of a dominant paradigm. Hence there is a scarcity of competing 
schools during periods of normal science. (Kuhn 1970a, p. 209) This paradigm is accepted as 
a valid framework for ongoing research. During periods of normal science, scientists are 
involved in problem-solving. The accepted problems, techniques and solutions are set by 
the ruling paradigm. Typical examples of paradigms are heliocentric astronomy, Newtonian 
mechanics, and Darwinian evolutionary biology. During normal periods of science, the 
practitioners of a scientific discipline accept the basic presuppositions of the paradigm. Their 
work consists in refining the representational force and explanatory power of the paradigm. 
Eventually, however, any period of normal science faces a crisis. It may then enter a period 
of extraordinary science. A crisis in science can happen for a number of reasons, for instance 
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as a consequence of the introduction of new laws or instruments. (Kuhn 1970a, p. 181) But 
it is, according to Kuhn, mostly associated with the failure of a paradigm to deal with all the 
phenomena in its domain. A crisis emerges when a paradigm faces significant anomalies. An 
anomaly occurs when there is a persistent disagreement between a theory’s predictions and 
the measured observations.4 If scientists fail to solve the problem, they may react in a 
number of ways: one is to shelve the problem; another is to let the discipline enter a 
revolutionary period. During such a period a number of competitors vie for dominance, until 
eventually a new paradigm prevails. (Figure I) 
 
A paradigm is a conceptual scheme which mediates the interaction between the scientist 
and the world of phenomena. It facilitates the mapping of symbolic structures onto the 
empirical world. According to Kuhn, scientists can only inhabit one paradigm at a time. It 
determines their world view and it takes a gestalt switch to convert them to a different 
paradigm. (Kuhn 1970a; Kuhn 1970b; Kuhn 1978, p. 363; cf. Nola 2003) They find it even 
difficult to talk to each other, because they inhabit ‘different worlds’.  
If this is the case why do paradigm shifts take place at all? Kuhn’s answer is that the seeds of 
revolutionary change are built into each paradigm. Each paradigm eventually enters a crisis 
period, due to anomalies or other factors. It is often younger scientists who initiate the 
process. 
                                                          
4
 Salmon (1990, p. 193) characterizes an anomaly as a ‘phenomenon that appears to have a small, possibly 
zero, likelihood given that theory.’  
Anomalies/Crisis 
Old 
paradigm 
New Paradigm 
Proliferation 
of Possible 
Solutions 
Figure I: The transition from an old to a new paradigm according to Kuhn’s paradigm 
model of scientific revolution. 
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The transition to a new paradigm introduces a large number of discontinuities in the growth 
of scientific knowledge. The whole conceptual network changes with respect to a) the 
meaning and reference of central terms; b) its ontology or the accepted ‘furniture’ of the 
world: ‘What were ducks in the scientist’s world before the revolution are rabbits 
afterwards.’ (Kuhn 1970a, p. 111); c) acceptable problems and techniques; d) 
incommensurability5: the conceptual networks are characterized by the rules of a particular 
paradigm, the elements of which are judged to be ‘incommensurable’ between successive 
paradigms. Although Kuhn accepts that successive paradigms can be compared, he holds 
that they cannot be translated into each other because of the non-compatibility of the 
components of one paradigm with another. For example Kuhn claims that the Earth became 
a planet only in the new heliocentric paradigm; d) the adoption of a new paradigm is a case 
of conversion and persuasion, for which rational reasons alone are not compelling.  
In terms of lines of descent Kuhn therefore emphasizes discontinuous breaks, without 
however completely abandoning lines of continuity, since a new paradigm must preserve 
past achievements. (Cf. Hoyningen-Huene 1993, §7.6; Worrall 2003; Rowbottom 2012) 
Contrary to Kuhn’s assertion in Structure, the Copernican turn does not really fit the Kuhnian 
paradigm model. Historians agree that astronomy was not in a state of crisis when 
Copernicus began his work. (Gingerich 1993; Kragh 2007, §1.4; Heidelberger 1980) Kuhn 
holds that crises may only be a ‘useful prelude’ to scientific revolutions but adds that a crisis 
is indispensable for a profound change of theory. (Kuhn 1961, §4; 1970a, p. 181) Yet other 
features show that the Copernican turn does not fit the paradigm model of scientific 
revolutions. No new anomalous observations threatened the Ptolemaic model. Copernicus 
did not invent new techniques to describe planetary motion. The Copernican version of 
heliocentrism is hardly incommensurable with geocentrism because of the large overlap 
between the two systems (even though the term ‘planet’ began to be applied to the Earth; 
cf. Kuhn 1970a, 149-50). Copernicus uses many of the Greek observations and their 
mathematical techniques. Most decisively, Copernicus adheres to the Greek dogma of 
circular motion. It is hard to detect as much as a partial breakdown of communication, 
which Kuhn continues to see as a feature of a crisis. (Kuhn 1990/2000, p. 100) As we shall 
see, the Copernicans employed plausibility arguments to demonstrate that geocentrism had 
much less probability, in the face of evidence, than heliocentrism. Rather than constituting a 
paradigm shift, Copernicus’s work represents a change of perspective, which instructs the 
astronomer to describe the phenomena from a heliocentric rather than a geocentric 
viewpoint. The small changes between geocentrism and Copernican heliocentrism did 
produce large-scale effects (Kuhn 1990/2000, p. 104), but only in the long run. The more 
mature Kuhn begins to focus on incremental changes and continuity. 
 
                                                          
5
 Several senses of ‘incommensurability’ can be distinguished in Kuhn’s work (see Bird 2011; Wray 2011, 65-
77); the most recent one, as discussed below, is taxonomic incommensurability 
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B. Kuhn’s developmental view 
In his ‘Postscript’, in response to criticism, Kuhn proposes a new terminology, i.e. 
disciplinary matrix (consisting of symbolic generalizations, belief in particular models, 
values, as well as exemplars – or paradigms, now meaning ‘shared’ examples).6 But he 
continued to be preoccupied by the problem of ‘incommensurability’, which came to mean 
‘untranslatability localized to one or another area, in which two lexical taxonomies differ.’ 
(Kuhn 1990/2000, p. 93) Kuhn began to stress that scientific communities share a certain 
lexicon, with shared meaning and referents of the terms employed, and that different 
lexicons imposed different structures on the world: hence the problem of untranslatability 
as a localized problem between divergent lexicons. Different lexicons are different sets of 
possible worlds, ‘largely but never entirely overlapping.’ (Kuhn 1986/2000, p. 61; 2000, Part 
1) What is of interest in the present context is that Kuhn characterizes his ‘mature’ position 
as Post-Darwinian Kantianism. (Kuhn 1990/2000, p. 104) The lexicons of scientific 
practitioners function like Kant’s categories – as preconditions of possible experience – but 
unlike the unchanging Kantian a priori categories they are a posteriori and subject to 
change. The term also indicates Kuhn’s return to evolutionary views, which first emerged in 
Structure: a) remaining faithful to his earlier views he still believes that science has no 
overriding epistemic aim (like verisimilitude), since the history of science should be regarded 
as ‘evolution from’ not ‘evolution towards’; b) the early distinction between ‘normal’ and 
‘revolutionary’ science is now replaced by the distinction ‘between developments which do 
and developments which do not require local taxonomic change.’ (Kuhn 1990/2000, p. 97); 
c) scientific revolutions are now to be regarded as analogous to ‘episodes of speciation in 
biological evolution.’ (Kuhn 1990/2000, p. 98; cf. Bradie 1986; Kuukkanen 2012) 
However one may judge the ‘lexicon-dependent structuring of the world’, Kuhn’s shift to the 
role of lexicons makes his narrative of the history of science more descriptive. The 
developmental view tends to emphasize how the meaning and reference of central terms, 
like ‘planet’, ‘mass’ change but it does not tell us why they change. Yet Kuhn does not 
abandon the aspect of evaluation. It is for this reason that alternative models of scientific 
growth are still of great relevance, in particular the ‘chain-of-reasoning’ model, which puts 
the emphasis on why, not just on how, theories, paradigm, lexicons or traditions change.  
C. Shapere’s Model of Scientific Revolutions.  
In the light of Kuhn’s paradigm model it was therefore hardly surprising that the analysis of 
historical case studies produced alternative models of scientific change, which pay more 
attention to questions of ‘descent with modifications’ but bear some resemblance to Kuhn’s 
later views. Of particular interest is Shapere’s ‘chain-of-reasoning model’ because it 
encapsulates the salient features of continuity models and places strong emphasis on lines 
                                                          
6
 For further discussions of the notions of ‘paradigm’ and ‘disciplinary matrix’ see Rowbottom (2011); 
Hoyningen-Huene (1993) 
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of descent. (Shapere 1966; 1989; Cohen 1985; Friedman 2001; cf. Weinert 1982) According 
to this model, the history of scientific ideas displays a transitional pattern, which captures 
both elements of continuity and discontinuity. Scientific revolutions constitute radical 
transitions (with fewer lines of continuity than discontinuity) but not discontinuous breaks. 
Instead of using the terminology of paradigms, the model speaks of ‘traditions’, which are 
characterized as conceptual networks, whose elements change differentially over time. 
Furthermore, these changes happen as a result of arguments and evidence, which means 
that we can speak of reasoned transitions between the conceptual components of the 
networks. These reasons are not just ‘values’, as in Kuhn’s view, which can then be applied 
differentially by different scientists. The reasons are of an empirical and theoretical nature 
and they justify the transitions between traditions. Traditions are therefore linked by ‘lines 
of descent’ with modifications. The career of, say, the notion of circular orbs from Greek to 
post-Copernican astronomy, through medieval contributions, like the impetus theory of 
motion, can be pursued and it be can understood why it became obsolete. This is an 
example of a reasoned transition because it arises from a problem situation, in which 
attempted solutions are evaluated through a chain of reasons and arguments. The 
transitions lead to the reorganization of at least part of the conceptual scheme, and they are 
Figure II: The ‘chain-of-reasoning’ model 
Reasoned transitions: 
differential deletions, 
omissions, additions, 
modifications 
Reasons, arguments, 
evidence and proofs, 
leading to lines of descent 
between traditions 
Old tradition:  
laws, 
exemplary 
problems, 
metaphysical 
assumptions, 
values 
Adoption of a new 
tradition with new 
elements: new 
perspectives, new 
methods & 
techniques, problem-
solving abilities 
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part of problem-solving attempts. These attempts leave traceable lines of descent between 
scientific models. During these reasoned transitions the conceptual networks are subject to 
various epistemological operations, like additions, deletions, omissions, modifications and 
replacements. (Figures II, III) 
What makes a comparison between Kuhn’s discontinuity model and Shapere’s continuity 
model possible is a two-fold rapprochement: 1) Kuhn’s paradigm model can be described in 
the language of the ‘chain-of-reasoning’ model: Kuhn seems to maximize the role of 
deletions, claiming that there is a great amount of discontinuity between two successive 
paradigms (differences in ontology, redefinitions of the problem situation, including the 
acceptability of problems and the techniques for their solution, changes in conceptual 
repertoire and world views). At the same time a new paradigm is required to preserve a 
large part of the ‘problem-solving ability’ of its predecessor and to solve the anomalies, 
which plunged it into crisis. (Kuhn 1970a, p. 169) 2) In his later work Kuhn appeals to five 
criteria of theory choice: accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity and fruitfulness. (Kuhn 
1983; Kuhn 1970a, p. 42; Kuhn 1970b; cf. Earman 1993; McMullin 1990; Kragh 2013, §1) He 
insists that taken separately the criteria are imprecise, taken collectively they are 
incompatible. The criteria of evaluation are ‘equivocal’. (Kuhn 1991/2000, p. 114) No single 
reason may influence theory choice for each member of a community. (Kuhn 1970a, 152) 
Hence they serve as values, not rules for theory choice. Nevertheless, in an afterthought, 
Kuhn grants that conformity, scope and fruitfulness could be regarded as ‘invariant values’ 
in the history of science, although through time they will be applied differentially by the 
scientific community. In order to dispel the impression of relativism, Kuhn insists that there 
are good reasons for adopting a new paradigm; but these reasons are interpreted as having 
the function of values and as such they are subject to differential assessment by scientific 
communities. They have persuasive functions for a group of practitioners. (Kuhn 1970a, pp. 
199-200) His mature work returns to the question of evaluation. He now emphasizes the 
importance of incremental changes in the body of beliefs but evaluations are relative to 
scientific research communities, their lexicons and achieved standards at a given time.  
(Evaluation) should be seen as a complex but unsystematic structure of distinct specialities or 
species, each responsible for a different domain of phenomena, and each dedicated to 
changing current beliefs about its domain in ways that increase its accuracy and the other 
standard criteria (…). (Kuhn 1990/2000, p. 119, cf. 1990/2000, p. 102) 
There are several continuities between Kuhn’s earlier and later work.7 One is that Kuhn 
insisted already in Structure that a new paradigm must display a better ‘quantitative 
precision than its older competitor.’ (Kuhn 1970a, pp. 153-4; cf. Kuhn 1961, §4; Kuhn 1975) 
It makes a great deal of sense to ask which of two actual and competing theories fits the facts 
better. (Kuhn 1970a, pp. 147, cf. pp. 169, 172; italics in original) 
                                                          
7
 For instance he remained critical of the correspondence theory of truth, of the assumption of a mind-
independent world, which is linked to his continued interest in incommensurability and scientific revolutions. 
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This passage appears in Kuhn’s discussion of Popper’s falsification criterion. Kuhn affirms 
that the falsification of a theory is at the same time a confirmation of a competing theory. 
This discussion has a Bayesian flavour, as some commentators have noticed (Earman 1993; 
Salmon 1990), and which will be explored below (see Appendix). Kuhn’s list of criteria makes 
no explicit reference to ‘evidence’ as a factor bearing on theory comparison and theory 
choice, but evidence can easily be subsumed under the criteria of accuracy and scope. (Cf. 
Worrall 2000, 135-6) Although Kuhn’s position is that the evaluation of evidence – in terms 
of empirical data and theoretical proofs – is subject to changing emphasis on values, his 
position also implies that there is ‘always an  objectively correct judgement to be made 
about how various rival theories, at a given time, stand in relation to evidence.’ But he 
continues to emphasize that such judgements remain specific to scientific sub-groups, which 
form their own lexicons.  
In one form or another, the rules of the true/false game are thus universals for all human 
communities. But the result of applying those rules varies from one speech community to the 
next. In discussion between members of communities with differently structured lexicons, 
assertability and evidence play the same role for both only in areas (there are always a great 
many) where the two lexicons are congruent. (Kuhn 1990/2000, p. 100, cf. 1991/2000, pp. 
111-6; 1970a, p. 155; Worrall 2003, p. 96; Worrall 2000, §3; Wray 2011, Part III) 
With the emphasis on continuity and incremental growth, Kuhn’s later ‘historical 
perspective’ moves much closer to the ‘chain-of-reasoning’ idea, which seeks a better 
balance between additions and deletions than Kuhn’s early paradigm view. In certain 
passages Kuhn seems to grant the permanency of such values across revolutions. 
Accuracy, precision, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness, consistency, and so on, simply are the 
criteria which puzzle solvers must weigh in deciding whether or not a given puzzle about the 
match between phenomena and belief has been solved. (…) As the developmental process 
continues, the examples from which practitioners learn to recognize accuracy, scope, 
simplicity, and so on, change both within and between fields. But the criteria that these 
examples illustrate are themselves necessarily permanent… (Kuhn 1973, pp. 338-9, quoted in 
Friedman 2001, pp. 50-1) 
There is therefore some overlap, which may serve as a basis for comparison and evaluation.  
In terms of the terminology of reasoned transitions progress in science can be characterized 
as evolving problem situations, which are linked by the differential operations on their 
components; the solutions to the problems lead to more complex problems, which in turn 
lead to more complex solutions. This characterization does not prejudice the further issue of 
whether scientific evolution happens in a Lamarckian or Darwinian guise. In fact, Kuhn 
characterizes the strictly Darwinian picture as holding that the history of science can be 
described without employing the notion of truth. Instead there are taxonomic divergences, 
with the concomitant problem of ‘incommensurability’ and the possibility of partial 
communication breakdown. (Kuhn 1987; 1990; 1991) Indeed, in his later work Kuhn 
continues to emphasise his opposition to the correspondence theory of truth. 
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Finally, what replaces the one big mind-independent world about which scientists were once 
said to discover the truth is the variety of niches within which the practitioners of these 
various specialities practice their trade. Those niches, which both create and are created by 
the conceptual and instrumental tools with which their inhabitants practice upon them, are as 
solid, real resistant to arbitrary change as the external world was once said to be. But unlike 
the so-called external world, they are not independent of mind and culture, and they do not 
sum to a single coherent whole of which we and the practitioners of all the individual scientific 
specialities are inhabitants. (Kuhn 1991/2000, p. 120) 
Kuhn’s paradigm model of scientific revolutions does not describe the emergence of the 
heliocentric view in Copernicus’s work very well. In his later work scientific revolutions are 
compared to biological speciation – or the emergence of specialized disciplines – but this is 
still characterized by non-cumulative growth. Revolutionary changes ‘involve discoveries 
that cannot be accommodated with the concepts in use before they were made.’ (Kuhn 
1987/2000, p. 14; 1991/2000, pp. 119-20) The question arises whether the subsequent 
history of cosmology, with its many radical discoveries and changes – Newton’s inverse-
square law, the General theory of relativity, Hubble’s law, the demise of the Steady State 
model in favour of Big Bang cosmologies, the discovery of the expanding and accelerating 
universe, inflationary scenarios and the multiverse – fit Kuhn’s evolutionary model of 
scientific development any better. Or is the ‘chain-of-reasoning’ model better equipped to 
capture the essence of the changes, which took place between the time of Copernicus and 
modern cosmology? As both models agree on lines of descent, it may be asked in which 
sense cosmology experienced another scientific revolution? 
IV. Main innovations in cosmology since Copernicus 
The richness of the material in the history of cosmology is partly due to the mass of 
empirical discoveries, which do not necessarily bring about a paradigm change. For the sake 
of analyzing the notions of progress and scientific revolution, it will be possible to confine 
the analysis to some of the major theoretical innovations – the transition from a static to an 
evolving universe, the notion of space-time and Einstein’s equivalence principle, the role of 
thermodynamics - in so far as they can be accounted for in terms of the surgical 
interventions on the conceptual networks.8 These deletions, additions, modifications and 
replacements will provide the evidence against which the two rival explanations can be 
tested. As the story can be told in terms of differential surgery, which is carried out on the 
various components, it should be possible to compare and evaluate these two rival 
explanations in the light of the available evidence. Given the evidence, it should then be 
possible to infer the most plausible account of some of the major theoretical discoveries in 
the history of cosmology. It is the thesis of this paper that the ‘chain-of-reasoning’ model 
accounts better for the evidence than either Kuhn’s paradigm or developmental models, 
simply because it offers a more balanced approach to the lines of reasoning that link the 
various cosmological models. 
                                                          
8
 The brief history follows the exposition in Kragh (2007) 
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This thesis is borne out by a consideration of some of the major lines of descent in the 
recent history of astronomy and cosmology. Many of the discoveries in astronomy from 
Newton to Einstein fit neatly into the classical tradition. These were either of an 
observational kind – for instance, the Bradley’s observations of stellar aberration (1728), 
Wilhelm Herschel’s discovery of Uranus (1781) and Johann Galle’s detection of the planet 
Neptune (1846) after both J.J. Leverrier and J. C. Adams had predicted its existence from the 
application of Newtonian mechanics; Foucault’s pendulum experiment (1850); or they were 
of a theoretical kind –  like Kant’s cosmological island view of the universe (1755), also 
derived from an application of Newton’s principles to cosmology and Laplace’s nebular 
hypothesis (1796).The classical paradigm had some notable puzzles to deal with – the 
nature of gravitation and Olbers’ paradox. But in Kuhnian terms these problems could be 
regarded as puzzles, which the paradigm could be expected to solve, rather than anomalies, 
which are persistent disagreements between the theory and empirical results. The first truly 
revolutionary challenge appeared with Einstein’s General theory of relativity (1916). In 
order to assess the transition from the old to the new cosmology let us consider three 
stages of its development. 
1. The role of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics in cosmological thinking.  
2. The notion of space-time. 
3. The transition from a static to an evolving universe. 
Ad 1) Thermodynamics and statistical mechanics emerged in the 1850s, during the heyday 
of classical physics, in an attempt to understand the efficiency of steam engines, without 
any reference to cosmology. Its central notions for present purposes are the Second law of 
thermodynamics and the statistical notion of entropy, expressed in Boltzmann’s 
equation  𝑆 = 𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑊 , where k is Boltzmann’s constant and W is the thermodynamic 
probability, which expresses the number of micro-states compatible with a given macro-
state. Although entropy was originally defined for closed systems, in a state of equilibrium, 
it was applied to the universe in the popular notion of the ‘heat death’. W. Thomson (1852) 
spoke of ‘a universal tendency in nature to the dissipation of mechanical energy’ and 
concluded his survey with the ominous warning that ‘the Earth was and will again be unfit 
for human habitation.’   
L. Boltzmann, like Thomson, lifted the notion of entropy to a cosmological level in an 
attempt to identify the arrow of time. Whilst it is generally accepted that entropy increases 
to a maximum in a closed system, like a container of gas molecules, Boltzmann assumes that 
the Second law can be applied, under certain reservations, to the whole universe. 
People have been amazed to find as an ultimate consequence of this proposition that the 
whole world must be hurrying towards an end state in which all occurrences will cease, but 
this result is obvious if one regards the world as finite and subject to the second law. 
(Boltzmann 1905, p. 170) 
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These early speculations about the heat death – the gradual dissipation of energy such that 
all energy differentials will disappear, turning the universe into a lifeless wasteland, in which 
entropy is maximized – stand in stark contrast to the Newtonian view of a universe, which is 
infinite in both space and time. Modern cosmology assumes that at least ‘our’ universe – 
which may be part of a multiverse – started life in a Big Bang (13.7 billion years ago) and it is 
then left with the question of the eventual fate of the universe. Different scenarios have 
been envisaged but for present purposes it is significant that according to latest findings the 
universe accelerates and will not end in a Big Crunch – or a return to its initial condition. 
According to current cosmologies, our universe seems to be characterized by asymmetric 
boundary conditions, which determine its actual behaviour. The universe starts in a low-
entropy Big Bang but is expected to collapse into high-entropy black holes, which will 
eventually evaporate to a state of even higher entropy, resembling a ‘heat death’. The 
relaxation time, τ, of thermodynamic systems is much shorter than the lifetime of the 
universe, T, which according to current calculations of the evaporation of black holes seems 
to amount to a lifetime of approximately 10100 years. Such an asymmetry suggests that the 
universe displays a cosmic arrow of time. 
In terms of continuity it is to be noted that the application of the notion of ‘heat death’ to 
the universe occurred during the reign of the classic tradition in astronomy, which 
originated in Newton, but underwent a long period of gestation until it was accommodated 
in modern cosmology, now under the notion of Big Chill. As far as this central notion is 
concerned it is not a case of ‘local untranslatability’; nor is the new notion of space-time 
which applies retrospectively to older theories. It is a case of retrospective accommodation. 
Ad 2) In his later work, Kuhn still speaks of ‘crises’, which occur when communication breaks 
down, due to the emergence of different lexicons. (Kuhn 1990/2000, p. 100) When Einstein 
developed the General theory of relativity, cosmology was not in a state of crisis. Rather the 
General theory was born out of a desire to overcome limitations in the Special theory of 
relativity. Hermann Minkowski developed the notion of space-time in order to provide a 
four-dimensional geometric model for the Special theory of relativity. Although the Special 
theory of relativity already departed from the Newtonian model in that it replaced Newton’s 
notions of absolute time and space by relativistic notions of temporal and spatial intervals, 
whose lengths depend on the velocity of the reference frame, from which they are 
measured – leading to the notions of relative simultaneity, time dilation and length 
contraction – it is still committed to a ‘privileged’ inertial reference frame, in which 
acceleration and gravity play no part. But Einstein’s equivalence principle between inertial 
and accelerated frames showed the need for a general principle of relativity, in which no 
reference frame enjoyed any privileged status. The consequence of this way of thinking led 
to a radical review of the notion of space-time. The remarkable feature of the General 
theory is that space-time ceases to be an inert background canvass. In the General theory 
the space-time structure itself becomes, in Wheeler’s famous words, fully dynamic in the 
sense ‘that matter tells space-time how to curve and curved space-time tells matter how to 
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move.’ Einstein’s General theory fundamentally changes our understanding of ‘gravity’, 
which was a puzzle for Newton, by replacing it with the notion of space-time curvature and 
non-Euclidean geometries. The General theory demonstrated its theoretical fruitfulness 
with the prediction of black holes. In its further development through Georges Lemaître and 
others it eventually gave rise to the Big Bang singularity, for which strong evidence emerged 
in the discovery of cosmic microwave background radiation (1965). Later the original Big 
Bang idea was refined by the introduction of the notion of inflation. The notion of space-
time presents a remarkable shift away from the observation of the universe to the 
theoretical understanding of the whole universe in terms of space-time structure. (Kragh 
2007, §3.1.4) 
Again, in terms of continuity it should be noted that the notion of space-time can be 
formulated in the language of differential geometry, which is a coordinate-free formulation 
and not paradigm- or lexicon-dependent in the Kuhnian sense. That is, it is neutral with 
respect to different ‘paradigms’ or ‘lexicons’, such that it can be applied to different space-
time theories – Newtonian mechanics, the Special and General theory of relativity - an 
application, which highlights the similarities and dissimilarities of space-time models in the 
classical and relativistic tradition. Given that the notion of space-time, in its coordinate-free 
formulation, can be applied to both Newtonian mechanics and relativistic mechanics means, 
in Kuhnian terms, that it does not change its meaning, and arguably not even its reference.  
Ad 3) Einstein’s General theory of relativity implied the model of a static universe, which, 
like Newton’s, was infinite in time but finite in space. The inference of a Big Bang origin from 
the expansion of the universe, as expressed in Hubble’s law, was not the work of Edwin 
Hubble.  Hubble’s discovery of the recession of the galaxies was made independently of the 
General theory. The discovery of a dynamic universe was the result of an application of the 
equations of the General theory to the universe by Alexander Friedman (1922, 1924) and 
Georges Lemaître (1927). Although the transition from a static to an evolving universe 
marks another significant shift in our understanding of the universe, it should be noted that 
an evolving universe is already part of the Kantian cosmology (1755).  Kant explains the 
current state of the universe – its constellation of galaxies as a nested hierarchy – as a result 
of the application of Newtonian laws to some sort of original chaos. The modern universe 
looks quite different from Kant’s island universe, since Kant argued in terms of Newtonian 
mechanics, whilst modern cosmology applies the General theory of relativity and Quantum 
Mechanics to cosmological events. The application of quantum mechanics to cosmology 
leads to the recent development of quantum cosmology, which employs the notion of 
decoherence (or the dislocalization of quantum interference into the environment) to 
explain the emergence of classical space-time. Classical space-time now emerges from a 
fundamental quantum level through mechanisms of decoherence, i.e. the transition from a 
time-less Wheeler-de Witt equation to the Schrödinger equation. (Kiefer 1996) It is now 
generally assumed that the boundary conditions of the universe are asymmetric, thus 
bestowing a cosmological arrow of time. In such a model of an expanding and accelerating 
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universe, questions of the beginning and the eventual fate of the universe arise. The 
assumption of a Big Bang beginning of the universe is now being challenged and replaced by 
the idea of a multiverse. One concern about the Big Bang is that it is put in ‘by hand’ when 
the low-entropy initial conditions of the universe should be derived from more 
fundamental, dynamic processes, as they are envisaged in various cosmological scenarios, 
like oscillating and cyclic universes or even baby universes. (See Carroll 2010 for an 
overview) 
Thus there exist a number of continuities and discontinuities between older and newer 
cosmological models and the question arises whether these lines of descent are better 
accommodated in the ‘chain-of-reasoning’ model, the Kuhnian paradigm model or the 
newer developmental model? 
 
V. New view: Chain-of-reasoning model  
None of the developments in astronomy and cosmology reviewed here were triggered by a 
crisis or striking anomalies in previous traditions. Furthermore, some of the central notions, 
like the Big Bang singularity, the arrow of time, the Heat Death, the evolving universe and 
space-time, are shared by the traditions. The General theory of relativity was such a 
profound theoretical change that, on Kuhn’s view, its emergence would have required a 
crisis. (Kuhn 1961, §4) Even in the absence of a crisis there needs to be some event, which 
makes scientist question the ‘rigidity of normal science’ but it is difficult to pinpoint such 
Kuhnian events in the recent history of astronomy and cosmology. (See Kuhn 1970a, p. 181) 
Nor is it the case that the history of astronomy/cosmology was predominantly concerned 
with puzzle solving (mopping-up operations). It is true that Kuhn rejects the view that 
normal science ‘is a single monolithic and unified enterprise’. (Kuhn 1970a, p. 49; cf. Kuhn 
1991/2000, p. 119) But Kuhn does have a tendency to characterize first normal science and 
later lexicon-using scientific communities as being marked by a paucity of competing 
theories or lexicons. However, as several commentators have pointed out (Earman 1993; 
McMullin 1993) even periods of ‘normal’ science are characterized by a competition 
between competitors. To mention two examples: even when it looked as if the Copernican 
model was gaining predominance in the 17th century, G. Riccioli’s textbook of astronomy 
(1651) still lists 5 competing models; the same is true of the General theory of relativity – it 
was never without competitors; and today’s cosmology is no exception as evidenced in the 
competition between string theory and loop quantum gravity. This means that although 
there is a predominant theory, there is no convergence to a single theory. 
According to Kuhn’s later views, revolutionary changes – speciation – are still accompanied 
by non-cumulative growth. (Kuhn 1987/2000, p. 14; 1991/2000, pp. 119-20) But note that 
lexical divergence may neither be a sufficient nor a necessary condition for revolutionary 
change. As Kuhn emphasizes repeatedly, the term ‘planet’ underwent significant meaning 
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change in the transition from geocentrism to heliocentrism, yet by his own early assessment 
and that of other historians, Copernican heliocentrism does not amount to a scientific 
revolution. J. B. Lamarck introduced a major taxonomic change when he departed from 
tradition and made species variable and subject to evolution, when the earlier tradition had 
regarded species as ‘fixed’. Yet Lamarck’s theory of progressive evolution is not regarded as 
a scientific revolution, mainly because it lacks a believable mechanism to explain 
evolutionary changes in species. On the other hand, notions like ‘space-time’, ‘heat death’ 
or ‘evolving universe’ can be cast in Newtonian and relativistic language, and yet, at least 
the General theory of relativity is truly a revolutionary theory. Kuhn also uses the notion of 
‘mass’ as an example of a term, which becomes incommensurable between Newtonian and 
relativistic physics. Yet relativistic mass approximates to Newtonian mass when relativistic 
speeds are replaced by classical speeds. It seems that for a scientific revolution more is 
needed than a consideration of the career of central terms. What matters are the reasons 
why these lexical notions undergo linguistic changes. (Cf. Shapere 1989, §4)  Such reasons 
often take the form of new explanatory principles (for example Darwin’s mechanism of 
natural selection or Einstein’s field concept of the space-time continuum), which explain the 
observable phenomena. 
What emerges from the brief survey of cosmology since Copernicus is that there are clear 
lines continuity and discontinuity; and further that even the older traditions contain 
embryonic anticipations of much later developments. Although Kuhn’s paradigm model 
allows for lines of descent, his emphasis on discontinuities prevents his paradigm model 
from adequately explaining the history of astronomy from Copernicus to Einstein and 
beyond. His newer developmental model focuses on the description of lexical changes (and 
speciation), which may however be neither necessary nor sufficient for revolutionary 
change. It is therefore appropriate to turn to the ‘chain-of-reasoning’ model, with its 
emphasis on lines of continuity and discontinuity, where these lines of descent are governed 
by reasons. (Figure III) Reasons can be provided in several ways: a) intersubjective empirical 
data as a result of objective observation or experiments; b) mathematical considerations, as 
in the derivation of an empirical law from more fundamental laws; c) logical considerations, 
as in Galileo’s famous tower thought experiment, with which he attempted to disprove the 
Aristotelian theory of motion; or d) plausibility considerations, as illustrated in Maestlin’s 
arguments against geocentrism. 
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Heliocentrism with 
elliptical motion 
(Kepler) 
NEW TRADITION: 
Classical Physics 
Descartes’s linear 
inertial motion 
MODIFICATION:  
Newton’s laws of 
motion and gravitation 
 
 
Classical Physics 
Kant’s Island 
Universe; 
Laplace’s Nebular 
Hypothesis 
MODIFICATION: 
Relativistic Physics 
Einstein’s General 
theory of relativity; 
quantum cosmology: 
multiverse 
OMISSIONS 
Galileo’s circular 
inertial; 
Aristotelian theory 
of motion 
ADDITION 
Galileo’s observations as 
evidence for 
heliocentrism 
OMISSION 
Hooke’s 
‘gravitational
’ explanation 
OMISSION 
Cosmology in 
Newtonian 
terms 
ADDITION                   
discovery of cosmic 
background radiation 
(1965) as evidence for Big 
Bang cosmology 
Figure III: 'Chain of Reasoning model', showing surgical interventions (additions, modifications, 
omissions) and lines of descent 
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As remarked above, Kuhn stresses that the evaluation of theory change is governed by 
values, such as accuracy, fruitfulness and the ability to solve outstanding problems 
quantitatively. But quantitative problem-solving involves evidence- both empirical and 
theoretical. A consideration of some plausibility arguments in the history of astronomy 
shows that reasons do not just function as values, which can be interpreted in different 
ways, and whose application may change over time; the reasons function as rules and carry 
epistemic import. Consider the dispute between proponents of geocentrism and 
heliocentrism at the beginning of the 17th century, which centred on epistemic reasons, in 
the guise of plausibility arguments.  
One plausibility argument, used by Maestlin and Kepler against geocentrism, concerns the 
apparent rotational velocity of the outer sphere of ‘fixed’ stars. On both the geocentric and 
the heliocentric model the rotation of the sphere of ‘fixed’ stars requires explanation but 
the physical consequences of the explanation are strikingly different, depending on whether 
a stationary or rotating Earth is assumed.  
Consider the divergent probabilities, which follow from a modern reconsideration of the 
angular velocities involved under the two scenarios.9 Under some simplifying assumptions, 
the angular velocity of the Earth for an observer at the equator is
h
km
s
m 1670464  . The 
geocentric view, by contrast, has to assume an angular velocity of the ‘fixed’ stars about the 
stationary Earth. A calculation produces a value of
h
km
s
m 65 1066.11062.4  . (Weinert 
2010) It is such an enormous rotational velocity of the stars – 1.66 million kilometres per 
hour, compared to 1670 km per hour for the Earth at the equator – which the Copernicans 
considered improbable on mechanical grounds.  By comparison, the orbital velocity of the 
Earth around the sun is 30km/s and the velocity of the solar system around the galactic 
centre is 225km/s. Thus Copernicans, like Kepler and Maestlin, base their plausibility 
arguments on a physical feature of the heliocentric model. The daily rotation of the Earth is 
the physical cause of the apparent rotation of the ‘fixed’ stars. This rotation is more 
probable, given the speeds involved, than the rotation attributed to the fixed stars around a 
stationary Earth in the geocentric model. Such probability considerations are clearly not 
lexicon-specific (cf. Kuhn 1990/2000, pp. 99-100; 1991/2000, p. 113) but coordinate-free, 
like the language of differential geometry.  
                                                          
9
To arrive at these figures we assume a circular motion of the earth on its own axis at the equator and a circular 
motion of the sphere of the fixed stars in a 24 hour period around the earth. The equation for the angular 
velocity in both cases is s
T
ffdrv StarsEarth
4
/ 64.8
1;   . The radius of the earth is 
m51037.6   and the radius of the earth-star distance is taken to be m101027.1  in line with Ptolemy’s 
views. Note that the angular velocity of the earth 45° to the north of the equator is only 1180km/h. If we adopt 
Maestlin’s smaller earth-star distance estimate - m9105.1  - we get a rotational velocity of 1132 German 
miles per ‘pulse’. If we count 4000 pulses per hour and take the traditional measure of 1 German mile = 7532 m, 
the figure increases to hrkm/104.3 7 , which, in Maestlin’s words, ‘truly exceeds all belief.’ (Quoted from 
Tredwell, 2004, p. 318) 
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Similar plausibility arguments led to the downfall of the steady-state theory, as opposed to 
the Big Bang cosmology after the discovery of the cosmic background radiation (1965). It is 
said to be the afterglow of the Big Bang, and hence was interpreted as direct evidence for 
evolving universe scenarios. But the steady-state cosmology defended a ‘perfect 
cosmological principle’, according to which the universe is both ‘spatially and temporally 
homogeneous, which implied an eternal universe.’ (Kragh 2007, pp. 203-4) Hence the Big 
Bang theory makes the evidence, i.e. the background radiation at a temperature of 2.7K, 
more plausible than the steady-state cosmology. (See Appendix for an illustrative 
application of Bayesianism to cosmological theories.) 
VI. Conclusion. 
It was noted that there is some overlap between the ‘chain-of-reason’ model and Kuhn’s 
later ‘historical view’ but there are also some significant points of divergence. 
 Kuhn continues to hold that a commitment to truth in the sense of Popper’s 
verisimilitude is ill-conceived, and opts instead for a redundancy theory of truth: 
A new body of belief could be more accurate, more consistent, broader in its range of 
applicability, and also simpler without for these reasons being any truer. (Kuhn 
1991/2000, p. 115; italics in original; cf. 1990/2000, p. 99) 
 A whiff of relativism remains in Kuhn’s later work since the post-Darwinian 
Kantianism he adopts calls for an interdependence of lexicons and ontologies: 
It is groups and group practices that constitute worlds (and are constituted by them). 
(Kuhn 1990/2000, p. 103; cf. 1986/2000, pp. 61, 85) 
 Incommensurability – as the local untranslatibility of some central terms between 
different lexicons - is still central to an evaluation of the scientific enterprise. (Kuhn 
1986; 1987; 1991) 
 Kuhn distinguishes between a diachronic and a synchronic sense of scientific 
development. (1990/2000, p.  97; cf. Díez 2007). The synchronic sense, as the 
increasing specialization of scientific disciplines, emphazises social aspects of 
scientific research. When scientific traditions split, it should come as no surprise that 
scientific sub-disciplines develop new lexicons. (See Wray 2011, Ch. 7) It is the 
diachronic sense, as the relation between successive ‘paradigms’, ‘theories’ or 
‘lexicons’, which require an adequate theory of scientific revolutions.  
 
The ‘chain-of-reason’ model will agree, in part, with Kuhn’s developmental approach 
regarding matters of evaluation. Evaluation is a question of the rationality of incremental 
belief changes rather than of the rationality of belief tout court. (Kuhn 1991/2000, pp. 112-
4) Such an evaluation was applied to the brief history of cosmology but it made no reference 
to the lexicon-dependence of world views, to the importance of incommensurability, and to 
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breakdowns in communication. It assumed that it was legitimate to consider reasons for 
surgical interventions, which lead to theory transitions, without relativization to lexicon-
stipulatable worlds. The outstanding question remains whether a ‘chain-of reason’ approach 
needs to take into consideration the implications of Kuhn’s post-Darwinian Kantianism. 
Integrating these insights takes us to an analytic four-stage model of a scientific revolution 
as a series of successive events: 
1. a turn or switch of perspectives, which often involves a questioning of existing 
presuppositions, like circular motion of planets or a static universe, and the 
perception of a problem, like the failure of the ancients to consider a coherent 
planetary system, which is not necessarily an anomaly; 
2. the introduction of new methods, principles of explanation and techniques with 
problem-solving ability, like calculus, differential geometry or unification; it is these 
underlying principles, which are the drivers of change, as can be seen in the 
emergence of Newtonian heliocentrism, Darwinian evolution, Einstein’s General 
theory of relativity or the unification of previously separated domains (e.g. electricity 
and magnetism; quantum theory and general relativity). 
3. the emergence of a new tradition through differential ‘chain-of-reasoning’ 
transitions, as a result of the problem-solving success of the emergent tradition; 
4. convergence of expert opinion on to a new tradition; this convergence does not 
exclude the coexistence of alternative models within the new tradition. 
 
This model of scientific revolutions reflects Kuhn’s view that scientific revolutions are not 
point-like, unique events but unfold over a period of time. (Kuhn 1962) It is a transition from 
convergent to divergent thinking. (Kuhn 1959) But this transition neither takes the form of a 
psychological gestalt switch, which the later Kuhn abandoned (since his emphasis was on 
research communities); nor does it create ‘lexically-stipulatable worlds’. It is justified by 
theoretical and empirical reasons, which according to the ‘chain-of-reasoning’ approach and 
Bayesian considerations have more epistemic weight than the loftier values, on which Kuhn 
focuses. (Cf. Shapere 1989; Cohen 1985; Friedman 2001)  The divergent assessment of the 
status of the Copernican model, mentioned above, and the consideration of the brief history 
of cosmology, may well reflect not only the extent to which lines of descent are to be 
considered but also which lines of descent are to be excluded or included in the surgical 
operations. Ultimately, the difference between Kuhn’s developmental account and the 
‘chain-of-reasoning’ model may well reside in this difference. 
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Appendix 
An objective Bayesian approach can illustrate how such criteria as accuracy and scope of 
evidence can be decisive in theory choice in a way that would be acceptable to the later 
Kuhn. 
The introduction of terms like ‘plausibility’ and ‘probability’ naturally invites a consideration 
of theory choice in terms of Bayesianism. 10  In order to avoid the problem of the 
determination of the probability of the priors,  EhP and the expectedness,  BEP 11
 
it will 
be convenient to restrict the discussion to a comparison of likelihoods or a likelihood ratio: 
that is how likely the rival hypotheses make the available evidence.(Salmon 1990; Weinert 
2009)  
Following Salmon (1990, p. 192), the likelihood ratio can be expressed in the equation 
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from which it follows that 
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Hence, T2 should be preferred over T1, after new evidence has come to light, if equation (2) 
is satisfied. If we let T1stand for either geocentrism or the steady-state cosmology 
respectively, and T2for the Copernican model or the Big Bang model respectively, it can 
easily be seen that this condition is satisfied. For the probability values for the likelihoods 
only need to diverge by 0.1 units, say   4.0.2 BTEP and   3.0.1 BTEP for the inequality 
to be satisfied, if we assume, plausibly, that     ''21 yBTPBTP  , where ‘y’ is some values 
                                                          
10
 Although Salmon restricts the consideration of plausibility arguments, as contained in Bayesian 
considerations, to the choice of prior probabilities, this restriction is not of much use in periods of 
revolutionary fervour, since often very unlikely hypothesis – unlikely as measured against the background 
knowledge – emerge. Therefore plausibility arguments must be used for the comparison of likelihoods 
(Weinert 2009). This brief exercise in the application of the Bayesian apparatus is not meant to revive the old 
debate about the compatibility of Bayesianism with Kuhn’s views on theory change (see Worrall 2000) but 
merely serves illustrative purposes. See Williamson (2010) for an introduction to objective Bayesianism. 
11
 The relationship between the expectedness and the prior probabilities and the likelihoods is:
         BTEPBTPBTEPBTPBEP &&   
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smaller than or equal to 1.12 The latter assumption is justified in the case of the before-
mentioned astronomical models, because the prior probabilities of heliocentrism and 
geocentrism respectively, were regarded to be approximately equal, as mentioned by 
Osiander.  
These likelihood considerations do not constitute knock-down arguments, because the 
discredited theories can introduce ad hoc hypotheses or modifications. But the question is 
always at what price such modifications are introduced; the fact is that evidence in favour of 
one theory and against another is usually cumulative. As W. Salmon observed, ‘the 
algorithms are trivial; what is important is the scientific judgement involved in assessing the 
probabilities that are fed into the equations.’ (Salmon 1990, p. 201) 
If plausibility considerations are used for the comparison of likelihoods, Bayesianism allows 
us to speak of the probability of competing ‘theories – thus leaving aside the further 
question whether the progress of science is to be judged in Lamarckian or Darwinian terms. 
The ‘chain-of-reasoning’ model generalizes such considerations and states that reasons – 
both empirical, like new discoveries, and theoretical, like plausibility arguments – lead to 
transitions to new traditions.  
 
 
Acknowledgement: The author would like to thank six referees for their constructive feedback on an 
earlier version of this paper.  
                                                          
12
A similar point can be made with respect to the phases of Venus. If the phases of Venus – full, ¾, ½, crescent 
– are regarded as evidence for or against the heliocentric and geocentric system, then this evidence bestows 
credibility on the Copernican system whilst the Ptolemaic system renders the evidence not just improbable but 
impossible.  On the Ptolemaic model we would at best see a crescent. 
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